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Brilliant_Rock
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- Jan 22, 2017
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This is a great analysis from The Diplomat. I'm posting excerpts, but click on the title to go to the full article (highly recommend):
Why Trump's Threat of 'Fire and Fury' Against North Korea Is So Dangerous
Trump’s empty threats are not only dangerous; they serve to undermine allied commitments and the credibility of U.S. threats.
[snip]...First, it bears stating that it’s not unusual in itself for U.S. officials to threaten nuclear retaliation against North Korea. In previous administrations, officials have often threatened an “effective and overwhelming” U.S. military response — but only in response to North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons. This point is critical because the United States has never overtly threatened first use against North Korea. Previous statements were meant to reiterate retaliatory intent, in order to reassure Seoul and Tokyo that they will be protected under Washington’s nuclear umbrella. Although American nuclear doctrine has always left open the possibility of nuclear first use, it is extremely rare for officials — let alone the president — to openly threaten or hint at being the first to launch a nuclear attack. On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis attempted to set the record straight on the conditions for retaliation by releasing a statement noting the “unquestionable commitment” of the United States to “defend ourselves from an attack.” North Korea has long known that the condition for facing ostensible nuclear “fire and fury” has been that it uses nuclear weapons first. Trump’s remarks on Tuesday suggested that this reality has changed.
So how has Trump threatened himself into a corner?
First, if Trump is serious and intends to carry out his threat, someone should explain to him the concept of “first strike instability,” which is particularly acute in the case of North Korea. The general notion of mutually assured destruction and the related idea of nuclear stability — that states don’t use strategic nuclear weapons because it would be mutually suicidal to do so — requires a very specific set of conditions to prevail, namely that both states possess secure second strike nuclear forces (no first strike can completely disarm the adversary’s nuclear forces, making retaliation certain) and that they accept those forces’ vulnerability (neither state attempts to overturn the adversary’s second-strike forces by explicitly targeting its arsenal)...[snip]
...
This is first-strike instability: If Kim Jong Un fears the United States and its allies are coming after his nuclear forces, his dominant strategic move is to use his nuclear weapons as quickly as he can, before he loses them. Failing to do so would result in his demise, so his only choice is to go first, go early, and go massively — even though the United States would almost surely deliver the promised “effective and overwhelming” retaliation for first use. Given that Kim’s ICBM arsenal might be gone in the first wave of even conventional attack, he simply cannot afford to go second. He may be left with too little — if anything at all — to penetrate American missile defenses if he waits for the cavalry to reach Pyongyang first.
This is why Trump’s off-the-cuff threats matter so much. Kim may view any efforts to carry out this threat as a possible prelude to regime change or an invasion, leaving him with no choice but to take the president at his word (we wonder how “fire and fury” translates in Korean). After a remark like this — which no doubt reinforces Kim’s fear of American-led disarmament or regime change — a “show of strength” that was actually carrying out this threat, or misperceived to be doing so, could quickly find the United States and its allies facing North Korean nuclear first use.
Put simply: new nuclear states with small arsenals faced with the threat of invasion or regime change can have incredibly itchy trigger fingers. It is important that Trump not rub poison ivy all over those fingers and make them even itchier.
If, however, Trump is blustering and has no intention of carrying out his threat in the face of future North Korean provocations, the bluff also carries significant strategic consequences. For one, it would undermine U.S. extended deterrence assurances and strengthen Kim Jong Un’s desire to “decouple” U.S. formal allies — South Korea and Japan — from the American alliance architecture. This was one of the chief strategic concerns regarding North Korea’s acquisition of an ICBM that we highlighted here last month.
Tokyo and Seoul can reasonably worry whether the United States will be deterred from carrying out this threat because North Korea can now hold the U.S. homeland at risk. Bluffing after such an explicit threat blows an ICBM-sized hole through American efforts at reassuring its allies in the region that it will be there for them when the shells start flying. The implications are severe — and could include Japan and South Korea looking to substitute for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence with their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Debates to these ends are underway in both countries...[snip]
All of this makes it even more difficult to set credible lines on North Korea’s behavior and nuclear program in the future. This is not a reality television show — it’s reality. It is tempting to chalk these remarks up to Trump’s shoot-from-the-hip, loose-cannon style and say that everything will be all right because no one should or will take them seriously. But historically, when presidents of the United States speak, nations sit up and take notice. There is no reason to think North Korea will ignore Trump’s words. And now the United States must either carry out the president’s threat and literally risk nuclear war, or admit it was a bluff and risk further emboldening North Korea and eroding the East Asian alliance structure so painstakingly built and reaffirmed for over 60 years.
Words matter, especially when nuclear weapons use is on the line. In a matter of 30 seconds on a Tuesday afternoon, Trump negotiated himself into a disastrous strategic corner.
Why Trump's Threat of 'Fire and Fury' Against North Korea Is So Dangerous
Trump’s empty threats are not only dangerous; they serve to undermine allied commitments and the credibility of U.S. threats.
[snip]...First, it bears stating that it’s not unusual in itself for U.S. officials to threaten nuclear retaliation against North Korea. In previous administrations, officials have often threatened an “effective and overwhelming” U.S. military response — but only in response to North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons. This point is critical because the United States has never overtly threatened first use against North Korea. Previous statements were meant to reiterate retaliatory intent, in order to reassure Seoul and Tokyo that they will be protected under Washington’s nuclear umbrella. Although American nuclear doctrine has always left open the possibility of nuclear first use, it is extremely rare for officials — let alone the president — to openly threaten or hint at being the first to launch a nuclear attack. On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis attempted to set the record straight on the conditions for retaliation by releasing a statement noting the “unquestionable commitment” of the United States to “defend ourselves from an attack.” North Korea has long known that the condition for facing ostensible nuclear “fire and fury” has been that it uses nuclear weapons first. Trump’s remarks on Tuesday suggested that this reality has changed.
So how has Trump threatened himself into a corner?
First, if Trump is serious and intends to carry out his threat, someone should explain to him the concept of “first strike instability,” which is particularly acute in the case of North Korea. The general notion of mutually assured destruction and the related idea of nuclear stability — that states don’t use strategic nuclear weapons because it would be mutually suicidal to do so — requires a very specific set of conditions to prevail, namely that both states possess secure second strike nuclear forces (no first strike can completely disarm the adversary’s nuclear forces, making retaliation certain) and that they accept those forces’ vulnerability (neither state attempts to overturn the adversary’s second-strike forces by explicitly targeting its arsenal)...[snip]
...
This is first-strike instability: If Kim Jong Un fears the United States and its allies are coming after his nuclear forces, his dominant strategic move is to use his nuclear weapons as quickly as he can, before he loses them. Failing to do so would result in his demise, so his only choice is to go first, go early, and go massively — even though the United States would almost surely deliver the promised “effective and overwhelming” retaliation for first use. Given that Kim’s ICBM arsenal might be gone in the first wave of even conventional attack, he simply cannot afford to go second. He may be left with too little — if anything at all — to penetrate American missile defenses if he waits for the cavalry to reach Pyongyang first.
This is why Trump’s off-the-cuff threats matter so much. Kim may view any efforts to carry out this threat as a possible prelude to regime change or an invasion, leaving him with no choice but to take the president at his word (we wonder how “fire and fury” translates in Korean). After a remark like this — which no doubt reinforces Kim’s fear of American-led disarmament or regime change — a “show of strength” that was actually carrying out this threat, or misperceived to be doing so, could quickly find the United States and its allies facing North Korean nuclear first use.
Put simply: new nuclear states with small arsenals faced with the threat of invasion or regime change can have incredibly itchy trigger fingers. It is important that Trump not rub poison ivy all over those fingers and make them even itchier.
If, however, Trump is blustering and has no intention of carrying out his threat in the face of future North Korean provocations, the bluff also carries significant strategic consequences. For one, it would undermine U.S. extended deterrence assurances and strengthen Kim Jong Un’s desire to “decouple” U.S. formal allies — South Korea and Japan — from the American alliance architecture. This was one of the chief strategic concerns regarding North Korea’s acquisition of an ICBM that we highlighted here last month.
Tokyo and Seoul can reasonably worry whether the United States will be deterred from carrying out this threat because North Korea can now hold the U.S. homeland at risk. Bluffing after such an explicit threat blows an ICBM-sized hole through American efforts at reassuring its allies in the region that it will be there for them when the shells start flying. The implications are severe — and could include Japan and South Korea looking to substitute for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence with their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Debates to these ends are underway in both countries...[snip]
All of this makes it even more difficult to set credible lines on North Korea’s behavior and nuclear program in the future. This is not a reality television show — it’s reality. It is tempting to chalk these remarks up to Trump’s shoot-from-the-hip, loose-cannon style and say that everything will be all right because no one should or will take them seriously. But historically, when presidents of the United States speak, nations sit up and take notice. There is no reason to think North Korea will ignore Trump’s words. And now the United States must either carry out the president’s threat and literally risk nuclear war, or admit it was a bluff and risk further emboldening North Korea and eroding the East Asian alliance structure so painstakingly built and reaffirmed for over 60 years.
Words matter, especially when nuclear weapons use is on the line. In a matter of 30 seconds on a Tuesday afternoon, Trump negotiated himself into a disastrous strategic corner.